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Susan H Williams*
ABSTRACT
Despite the enormous literature on federalism in constitutional design, and the growing
attention to gender equality in constitutional design, there has been remarkably little
attention paid to the interaction between the two. This article seeks to provide a
summary of the existing literature on this intersection, to apply the insights of that
literature to the case of Myanmar, and to offer a contribution concerning the theoretical
connections between federalism and gender equality. The analysis generates four
primary conclusions. First, federalism is inherently neither good nor bad for gender
equality: it all depends on the details of the federal system and the context in which they
are applied. Second, there are, nonetheless, some guidelines that can be gleaned from
the experiences of countries around the world about the design elements that can make
federalism more or less useful for promoting gender equality under different conditions.
Third, applying these elements in the case of Myanmar suggests that women's
organisations might make common cause with the ethnic minority groups that are
negotiating with the government and the army over federalism issues because the
women share with these groups certain goals with respect to federal systems. And
fourth, there is a connection between gender and federalism, not at the pragmatic or
design level, but at the theoretical level. This connection concerns the type of (ideal)
orientation that is required of citizens in a federal system and the ways in which that
orientation might be valuable for gender equality. It is, then, the character of federal
citizens, rather than the federal system itself, that could be inherently beneficial to
gender equality.
* Walter W Foskett Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Constitutional Democracy
at Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I would like to thank Cody Vaughn, Yah Dolo-
Barbu and Samantha Von Ende for their research assistance on this piece. I am also grateful
to the Joint Peace Fund in Myanmar for asking me to do the presentation on these issues that
sparked this research. Finally, my gratitude goes to the Women's League of Burma, with
which I have been proud to be associated for over a decade. The commitment and idealism
of these women is the inspiration for this work and I hope that some of these ideas will prove
useful to them in their struggle for gender equality as Myanmar moves toward a more federal
system.
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I INTRODUCTION
There is an enormous literature on federalism in constitutional design,1 and a growing
literature on gender equality in constitutional design,2 but remarkably little attention to
the interaction between the two. This article seeks to provide a summary of the existing
literature on this intersection, to apply the insights of that literature to the case of
Myanmar, and to offer a contribution concerning the theoretical connections between
federalism and gender equality. This analysis will generate four primary conclusions.
First, federalism is inherently neither good nor bad for gender equality: it all depends
on the details of the federal system and the context in which they are applied. As a result,
it would be useful if scholars and constitutional drafters stopped asking the general
question about whether federalism helps or hurts women. Second, there are, however,
some guidelines that can be gleaned from the experiences of countries around the world
about the design elements that can make federalism more or less useful for promoting
gender equality under different conditions. In other words, certain kinds of federal
structures may help or hurt women and I will offer a list of some of these elements and
examples from countries where they were effective, for good or ill. Third, applying these
elements in the case of Myanmar generates the conclusion that women's organisations
might make common cause with the ethnic minority groups that are negotiating with
the government and the army over federalism issues because the women share with
these groups certain goals with respect to federal systems. At the same time, the
women's movement needs to be focused on ensuring that the type of federalism adopted
fits the guidelines I will describe, so that it will be a benefit rather than a barrier to gender
equality. The case study is not an exhaustive evaluation of the design of federalism for
gender equality in Myanmar, 3 but an illustration of the more general approach
suggested in the theoretical analysis of federalism and gender equality. Finally, I will
suggest that there is a connection between gender and federalism, not at the pragmatic
or design level, but at the theoretical level. This connection concerns the type of (ideal)
orientation that is required of citizens in a federal system and the implications of that
orientation for gender equality. I will argue that federalism requires and encourages
citizens to recognise a plurality of authority systems and to develop an openness to the
challenges each of these multiple systems pose for the others. This sort of orientation, I
1 For a small sampling, see, eg, Donald L Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of
California Press, 2nd ed, 2000); Arend Lijphart, 'Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and
Empirical Links' (1979) 12(3) Canadian Journal of Political Science 499; Andrew Reynolds, The
Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy (Oxford
University Press, 2002).
2 See, eg, Beverley Baines and Ruth Rubio-Marin (eds), The Gender of Constitutional
Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Susan H Williams (ed), Constituting
Equality: Gender Equality and Comparative Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press,
2009); Beverley Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez, and Tsvi Kahana (eds), Feminist Constitutionalism:
Global Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Kim Rubenstein and Katharine G
Young (eds), The Public Law of Gender: From the Local to the Global (Cambridge University Press,
2016); Helen Irving (ed), Constitutions and Gender (Edward Elgar, 2017).
3 For a more detailed assessment of some of the specifics of a federal system in Myanmar that
would help promote gender equality, see Christine Mary Forster, 'Advancing Gender
Equality Within a Federal Governance Model in Myanmar', (Report, UNWomen, 2017) at 35-
45 (suggesting specific allocations of particular subject matters to the union or the state
levels).
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will suggest, is valuable for the project of promoting gender equality. It is, then, the
character of federal citizens, rather than the federal system itself, that could be inherently
beneficial to gender equality.
II FEDERALISM
Before it is possible to determine whether federalism helps or hurts gender equality, it
is necessary to define federalism. Federalism is, of course, a contested concept.4 While
many different definitions might be useful for different purposes, I am going to use a
very simple and minimalist definition that I hope will cover any system that most people
would consider federal (and probably many systems that some people would not).
Because my focus is on constitutional design, I adopt a constitutional definition.
Federalism, as I will use it, is any system in which devolution of power to sub-national
units is constitutionally guaranteed.5 This definition distinguishes federal systems from
systems of voluntary decentralisation, in which the central government could choose to
reduce or eliminate the powers of the subnational units. It does not, however, require
any particular amount of devolved power or any particular form of devolution. It leaves
open the possibility of sub-national units exercising specifically enumerated subject
matter powers (as under the current Constitution of Myanmar),6 or holding all residual
powers (as in the US), 7 or exercisin powers of administration even in areas of national
policy-making (as in Germany). It leaves open the possibility of asymmetrical
federalism, in which different sorts of sub-national units exercise different powers.9 But
it does require that some powers be devolved to the subnational units by the
4 See Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism (University of Alabama Press, 1987) 34-8 (comparing
contrasting models of federalism); see also Thomas Hueglin, 'Federalism at the Crossroads:
Old Meanings, New Significance' (2003) 36 Canadian Journal of Political Science 275, 275 ('On
all counts, federalism has remained a contested concept.')
5 Compare Elazar, above n 4, 34 ('Federalism is based on a particular kind of constitutional
framework.'); Vincent Ostrom, 'The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-
Governing Society' (ICS Press, 1991), 7 ('The standard definition of federalism is a system of
government where authority is exercised concurrently by a national government and state or
provincial governments.')
6 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, May 29, 2008, sch 2.
7 United States Constitution amend X.
8 See Grundgesetz fir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Basic Law of the Federal Republic of
Germany] art 83, translation at <https://www.gesetze-im-
intemet.de/englisch gg/index.html> ('The Lander shall execute federal laws in their own
right insofar as this Basic Law does not otherwise provide or permit.'); Arthur Gunlicks, 'The
Lander and German Federalism' (Manchester University Press, 2003) 60-1 ('As we have seen
above, the federation in fact carries most of the responsibility for legislation, while the Lander
are primarily responsible for administration.').
9 See Donald L Horowitz, 'The Many Uses of Federalism' (2007) 55 Drake Law Review 953, 959
('Third, federalism can make it possible to mitigate discontent by making special, asymmetric
arrangements for regions with special problems or distinctive identities'); Charles D Tarlton,
'Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation' (1965) 27
The Journal of Politics 861, 869 ('The ideal asymmetrical federal system would be one
composed of political units corresponding to differences of interest, character, and makeup
that exist within the whole society').
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Constitution and that such powers be exercised by state or provincial or autonomous
regional governments1 0 independently of the central government.
In terms of constitutional design, this basic definition focuses on three categories of
mechanisms as the hallmarks of federal systems. The first category directly addresses
the powers devolved to states and the ability of state governments to exercise those
powers autonomously. This set of mechanisms includes both lists of powers (union,
state, and/or concurrent) and provisions that establish the ability of state governments
to act autonomously and efficaciously (eg, guaranteeing states the right to choose their
own chief executive or the administrative ability to administer their own affairs). A
second set of mechanisms concerns the process of resolving conflicts between exercises
of power at the union and state levels. These include a supremacy or subsidiarity clause
(suggesting a rule for decision in such cases) and a dispute resolution mechanism (eg, a
Supreme Court or Federalism Council). Finally, a last set of mechanisms concerns one
special set of powers that may be devolved to states: the power to influence the making
of union policy and law. Such mechanisms may include an upper house with
representation for (or controlled by) the states, intergovernmental bodies that include
representation for states, and union-level state of emergency procedures that give state
governments veto or oversight powers.11
Defined in this general way, and from a design perspective, a federal system is one
in which some combination of the mechanisms in each of the categories above results in
the constitutionally guaranteed devolution of powers to subnational units. The question
taken up by a number of political scientists interested in gender equality is: does such a
system help or hurt women's struggle for equality?
III FEDERALISM AND GENDER EQUALITY IN GENERAL
Political scientists have argued over whether federal systems help or harm women in
their pursuit of policies promoting gender equality. 12 Interestingly, observers on both
sides of this debate have identified the same three basic characteristics of federal
systems, each of which has both advantages and disadvantages to women's political
activism. The three characteristics are: (1) the fact that federal systems provide multiple
access points for political activism (at a minimum the two different levels, union and
10 For the purposes of brevity, I will, from this point on, use 'states' to refer to all forms of
subnational units that are constitutionally authorised to exercise powers, whether large or
small, symmetrical or asymmetrical.
11 For a discussion of a range of such emergency powers for states, see Susan H Williams, 'States
of Emergency and Federalism: An Exploration of the Implications for Constitutional Design'
(unpublished paper on file with the author).
12 For views finding federalism has a positive impact, see, eg, Louise Chappell, 'Interacting with
the State: Feminist Strategies and Political Opportunities' (2000) 2 International Feminist
Journal of Politics 244; Sylvia Bashevkin, Women on the Defensive: Living Through Conservative
Times (University of Chicago Press, 1998). For views that federalism disadvantages women,
see, eg, Judith Resnik, 'Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender and the Globe' (2001) 619
Yale Law Journal 111; Jill Vickers, 'Why Should Women Care About Constitutional Reform?'
in David Schneiderman (ed), Conversations Among Friends: Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary
Conference on Women and Constitutional Reform (Centre for Constitutional Studies 1991); Jill
Vickers, 'Why Should Women Care About Federalism?' in Douglas Brown and Janet Hiebert
(eds), Canada: The State of Federation 1994 (Canadian Institute of Intergovernmental Relations,
1994).
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state), (2) the fact that federal systems decentralise power to more local levels, and (3)
the fact that federal systems generally involve multiple subnational entities. Each of
these facts can be of benefit to activism for gender equality or can create barriers to
change.
The existence of at least two levels of government that provide multiple access points
can be of benefit to women trying to get more gender equal policies adopted for two
reasons. First, it allows for forum shopping: choosing the most hospitable venue for each
issue.1 3 For example, if women are trying to get a certain employment discrimination
policy adopted, they can approach either the union or particular state legislatures,
depending on which is more open to this policy. Second, the multiple access points also
facilitate multiple bites at the apple: if a reform fails in its first attempt, it is often possible
to try again quickly in a different forum. 14 In a centralised system, on the other hand,
only one venue may be available and that may make it difficult to try again for some
time.
The fact that federal systems involve decentralisation of power to more local levels
also has potential benefits for women. First, there are simply more positions and
therefore more opportunities for political participation.15 In addition, women in many
countries find it easier and more congenial to participate in politics at the local level,
rather than at higher levels of government. Partly this is simply a matter of logistics:
because women carry the majority of responsibility for child care and homemaking, they
find it difficult to participate in politics that take place far away from their homes and
families. 16 There may also be psychological or motivational issues: women may feel
13 See Melissa Huassman, Marian Sawer and Jill Vickers (eds), Federalism, Feminism and
Multilevel Governance (Ashgate, 2010) 229 ('forum shopping ... lets women work around a
blockage at one governance level and take advantage of an opening at another level'); see
also Louise Chappell, 'The "Femocrat" Strategy: Expanding the Repertoire of Feminist
Activists' (2002) 55 Parliamentary Affairs 85, 92 ('[F]ederalism has been important to
Australian femocrats because they have been able to shift their attention between
governments when blocked at one level or another.'); see also Bashevkin, above n 12, 10
('federal arrangements with their multiple access points appeared to assist feminist interests,
because decision makers in North America could not exert a reliable power of veto over
group claims as they could in Britain.') (internal quotations and footnote omitted).
14 See Alison Grey Anderson, 'The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934' (1984) 70 Virginia Law Review 813, 842 ('Federalism can be seen as in some sense
intended to give interest groups two chances.').
15 See Marian Simms, 'Gender, Globalization and Democratization' in Rita Mae Kelly et al (eds),
Gender, Globalization, and Democratization (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Fiona Mackay,
'Devolution and the Multilevel Politics of Gender in the UK' in Haussman, Sawer and
Vickers, above n 13.
16 See Jennifer L Lawless and Richard L Fox, 'Men Rule: The Continued Under-Representation
of Women in U.S. Politics' (American University Women & Politics Institute, 2012) 13-15
('What emerges from this analysis of family roles and structures is the fact that women,
though no longer directly impeded from thinking about a candidacy just because they have
certain familial responsibilities, face a more complex set of choices than do their male
counterparts'); see also Directorate General for Internal Policies of the European Parliament,
'Women in Decision-Making: The Role of the New Media for Increased Political
Participation' (2013) 31 ('The situational explanation emphasises the unequal division of
unpaid labour and the higher burden of family responsibilities that women bear which
inhibits their engagement in politics.').
2018 495
Federal Law Review
more confident about their ability to understand local issues and to be effective leaders
at the local level.1 7 Finally, there are clearly structural issues that account for women's
greater levels of participation at local levels: they face fewer obstacles in terms of party
gatekeepers and campaign funding in local elections.18 For all of these reasons, women
in some countries participate in higher rates at local and state levels than in union-level
governments. 19 To the extent that federal systems push policy-making power down to
these lower levels, they increase women's access to such power.
The fact that federal systems generally include multiple subnational units can also
function as a benefit to women working for gender equality. These multiple units
contribute to the forum shopping and multiple bites at the apple discussed above. They
also offer what is sometimes described as a 'laboratory' or 'contagion' effect: if one state
experiments with a reform and it is successful, then other states are likely to follow
suit.20 Sometimes this dynamic is characterised as competition between the different
17 For some evidence supporting the idea that women are more likely to consider themselves
qualified to run for office at the local level, see Jennifer L Lawless and Richard L Fox, 'Why
Are Women Still Not running for Public Office?' (2008) 16 Issues in Governance Studies,
Brookings Institute. One result of this difference is that women are much more equally
represented on local school boards. See Janie Boschma, 'Why Women Don't Run for Office',
Politico, 6 December 2017 ('One arena in which women are willing to run for office-and do
seem to feel qualified-is the local school board. A poll of school superintendents estimates
that women represented 43 percent of the nation's school board members in the 2014-15
school year.').
18 Party gatekeepers are one of the primary barriers to women's political participation. See
Christine Cheng and Margit Tavis, 'Informal Influences in Selecting Female Political
Candidates' (2011) 64 Political Research Quarterly 460, 461 ('The first mechanism is that
gatekeepers are more likely to directly recruit and promote people like themselves.'). The
suggestion in text is that this barrier might be lower in the context of local politics, but there
is little evidence to document any differences. In terms of fundraising, it is plain that
competing in national and state elections is more expensive than in local ones and
fundraising is the number one barrier cited by women candidates. See Jena Macgregor, 'Why
More Women Don't Run for Office', Washington Post, 21 May 2014 (citing a report by Political
Parity studying women who ran for legislative positions). For a general description of these
barriers, see Judith Warner, Opening the Gates: Clearing the Way for More Women to Hold Political
Office (19 May 2017) Center for American Progress
<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2017/05/19/427206/openi
ng-the-gates/>.
19 For an interesting empirical study, see Richard Vengroff, Zsolt Nyiri and Melissa Fugiero,
'Electoral System and Gender Representation in Sub-National Legislatures: Is there a
National- Sub-National Gender Gap?' (2003) 56(2) Political Research Quarterly 163, 168 (the
rate of women's political participation in sub-national legislatures is higher than in national
legislatures in developed countries, but not in less developed countries). In the US, for
example, women are 24.9% of all state legislators, see National Conference of State
Legislatures: National Conference of State Legislatures, Women in State Legislatures for 2017
(11 July 2017) <http://www.ncsl.org/legislators-staff/legislators/womens-legislative-
network/women-in-state-legislatures-for-2017.aspx>, and 20% of Congress: Center for
American Women and Politics, Women in Elective Office 2018 (2018)
<http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/women-elective-office-2018>.
20 For general discussions of such effects, see, eg, David Osborne, Laboratories of Democracy
(Harvard Business School Press, 1988); G Alan Tarr, 'Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis,
Federalism, and Scientific Management' (2001) 31 Publius 37; Julianna Pacheco, 'The Social
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sub-state units over policy improvements. 21 This ability to try out a reform in one place
and to see the effects of that in other places is one of the general benefits of federalism
often highlighted by political scientists. 22 The point here is that this general benefit
applies to gender equality along with other sorts of reforms. Based on these arguments,
some scholars have suggested that federalism is helpful to women in terms of their
political participation and their ability to promote a gender equality agenda. 23
Ironically, however, each of these characteristics of federal systems can also prove to
be a barrier to gender equality. The multiple access points that facilitate forum shopping
also create a serious resource strain on feminist movements. Women must often litigate
or lobby for a given policy change in all of these different fora in order to achieve their
goals. For example, it is not enough to get an employment discrimination policy adopted
in only one state: it will then be necessary to take that example to other states and try to
get it adopted in all of them. If a policy could be resolved once for everyone, as in a
unitary system, that can be much more efficient in terms of the use of scarce advocacy
resources.24 The argument applies to human resources as well as financial ones: multiple
systems of government mean multiplication of political offices and more positions
require more women candidates in order to achieve equal representation levels.
The fact that federal systems move policy-making down to more local levels can also
be a double-edged sword for women. While it may facilitate women's access to policy-
Contagion Model: Exploring the Role of Public Opinion on the Diffusion of Antismoking
Legislation Across the American States' (2012) 74 Journal of Politics 187, 188-9.
21 See Paul Pierson, 'Fragmented Welfare States' (1995) 8(4) Governance 449; Jill Vickers, 'A Two-
Way Street: Federalism and Women's Politics in Canada and the United States' (2010) 40
Publius 412.
22 See generally Jenna Bednar, 'Nudging Federalism toward Productive Experimentation'
(2011) 21 Regional & Federal Studies 503; see also Craig Volden, 'States as Policy Laboratories:
Emulating Success in the Children's Health Insurance Program' (2006) 50(2) American Journal
of Political Science 294, 310 ('As used here, this approach uncovers a robust pattern of states
acting as policy laboratories'); see also Wallace E Oates, 'An Essay on Fiscal Federalism'
(1999) 37 Journal of Economic Literature 1120, 1132 ('recent legislation that transfers the
responsibility for these programs back to the states represents ... a recognition of the failure
of existing programs and an attempt to make use of the states as "laboratories" to try to find
out what make sorts of programs can work'); see Susan Rose-Ackerman, 'Risk Taking and
Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?' (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 593,594 ('If
state and local governments are supposed to be "laboratories", then my model predicts that
few useful experiments will be carried out in them').
23 See Fiona Mackay, 'Descriptive and Substantive Representation in New Parliamentary
Spaces: The Case of Scotland' in Marian Sawer, Manon Tremblay and Linda Trimble (eds),
Representing Women in Parliament: A Comparative Study (Routledge, 2006) (political
participation); see also Fiona Mackay, 'Devolution and Multilevel Politics of Gender' in
Haussmann, Sawer and Vickers, above n 13; Chappell, above n 13, 251 (gender equality
agenda); see also Bashevkin, above n 12, 10 (gender equality agenda).
24 This is the point, of course, in the common strategy of seeking to guarantee women's
reproductive rights through the federal Constitution, rather than fight them out in every state
legislature. See Melissa Haussman, Abortion Politics in North America (Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2005). Thus, the unified mute is possible for some issues in a federal system, but
the whole point in federalism is to limit the number and importance of such issues, so as to
maintain the ability of subnational units to make policy independently. The point is not that
federalism makes a unified approach impossible for everything, but that it makes it less
available for many things.
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making positions, as discussed above, it also carries two potential disadvantages
compared to centralised decision-making. First, local communities ma be more
conservative in terms of gender roles and ideologies than national elites.5 This is a
highly contextual issue, of course, and will not be true everywhere. But it is a common
enough phenomenon around the world to be a serious concern for feminist reformers
facing federalising efforts. 26 Where it is true, shifting policy power to these local levels
may make it harder for feminist reforms to be adopted. Second, bringing power down
to the more local level systematically creates an advantage for geographically
concentrated groups as opposed to other sorts of groups. Empowering local
communities is, of course, one of the primary reasons for the adoption of federal
systems: communities that are minorities at the national level but majorities (or at least
much more substantial players) in the smaller arena will have more control in a
decentralised system. 27 The problem is that women are not a geographically
concentrated minority; in most countries, they are a geographically dispersed majority.
As a result, their political power is not increased by decentralisation in this way. And
since the power of other sorts of communities is increased, women as a demographic
may be weaker relative to these groups than they would be at the national level. 8
Finally, the existence of multiple subnational units may also create costs for women.
In addition to the resource strains mentioned above, the existence of many states making
different policy choices means that women in different areas of the country may have
very different rights and/or benefits. For example, the availability of child care or
reproductive health services may be dramatically different across states.29 For reformers
who believe that such inequality between women is itself a feminist issue, this is a
disadvantage of a federal system.
25 For a study of the gap between elite and non-elite attitudes toward gender equality, see Claire
Wallace, Christian Haerpfer and Pamela Abbott, 'Women in Rwandan Politics and Society'
(2008/9) 38(4) International Journal of Sociology 111.
26 See Vickers, above n 21, 'A Two-Way Street: Federalism and Women's Politics in Canada and
the United States', 419 ('Most English-Canadian feminists favor federal government control
of social programs which they fear conservative provincial governments will dismantle').
27 See Elazar, above n 4, 88 ('The second face of territorial democracy was that represented by
Massachusetts and most of New England, whereby different groups were expected to settle
in different territorial entities which they then could use to build polities that would express
their separate visions and protect their separate group interests'); see also Arend Lijphart,
Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (Yale University Press, 1977) 42
('Similarly, federalism can be used as a consociational method when the plural society is a
"federal society": a society in which each segment is territorially concentrated and separated
from the other segments, or, to put it differently, a society in which the segmental cleavages
coincide with regional cleavages.'); see also Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, above n 1,
613-17 (discussing the concept of 'homogenous states' that refers to territorial devolution to
geographically concentrated ethnic groups).
28 See, eg, Haussman, Sawer and Vickers, above n 13, 234 ('Chapters on India, Nigeria, Russia
and Canada show how women's entitlement to 'national' citizenship rights such as gender
equality can be challenged by or made to compete with group rights of ethnic, religious,
national or language communities at another level of local government.')
29 See ibid ('Leaving welfare provisions to the latter may result in uneven access to programs
and services across the country and unequal citizenship entitlements.'); see also
('[F]ederalism arguably remains an important obstacle to that pan-Canadian goal.').
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Thus, the general characteristics of federal systems create both potential
opportunities and potential challenges from the perspective of gender equality.
Depending on the circumstances in the country-political, cultural, economic and
social- the very same federal system could be either a benefit or a harm: indeed, it could
be both at the same time, in different ways. At the abstract level, then, it is not possible
to say that federalism in general is either good or bad for women as a group or for the
promotion of gender equality.
Turning from an abstract approach to a more empirical one, the question then
becomes: is there any empirical evidence that federalism helps to promote or hinder
gender equality? In order to determine whether federalism has an impact on gender
equality, we used the Gender Inequality Index provide by the United Nations
Development Programme 30 as the dependent variable. We then ran a regression with
the United Nations Human Development index31 as a control variable and federalism
as a binary, dummy explanatory variable. We limited the set for analysis to countries
that showed up both on the United Nations' Gender Inequality Index and United
Nations Human Development Index. Countries appearing on both lists were categorised
as being federal, based on a qualitative assessment of their constitutions' vertical
separation of powers. The federal countries were: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Iraq,
Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Spain,
Switzerland, Tanzania, United Arab Emirates, United States and Venezuela. Four of the
federal countries in the world were not present on both lists and were, therefore, not
included in the analysis (Comoros, Micronesia, Nigeria and Saint Kitts and Nevis). As a
result, only 24 of the 28 federal countries in the world were analysed. Given the value of
the p-value, however, it is unlikely that the inclusion of these four countries would affect
the outcome of the analysis.
With a linear regression analysis, controlling for development using the Human
Development Index, we find that there is no statistically significant relationship between
a country being federal and its Gender Inequality Index. As the chart indicates, the p-
value is .703 and the intercept is -7.639 with a 95% confidence interval spanning values
of -45.145 and 31.866. The extremely high p-value and the 95% confidence interval
containing both positive and negative values indicate no relationship between federal
structure and gender equality. Federal countries are no more or less likely to have high
levels of gender equality than non-federal countries. In other words, federal countries
vary widely in terms of their gender equality policies, as do non-federal countries.
Neither category has a statistically significant likelihood of being more gender equal.32
30 The Gender Inequality Index was multiplied by 1000 to transform from a three-digit decimal
to integers so that the output in the regression would yield a more intuitive result. This
transformation is purely aesthetic and does not affect the results. See United Nations
Development Programme, Gender Inequality Index (2016) available at
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii>.
31 The Human Development Index was multiplied by 1000 to transform from a three-digit
decimal to integers so that the coefficient in the regression would yield a more intuitive result.
This transformation is purely aesthetic and does not affect the results. United Nations,
Human Development Index (2016) <htp://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI>.
32 I am very grateful to my research assistant, Cody Vaughn, for doing the calculations for this
analysis. His assistance was invaluable.
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Regression analysis
Intercept 1128.821 33.63'/ 2.986x1U-- 1062.3/8 119J.262
HDI x 1000 -1.083 0.0468 2.284x10-52  -1.175 -0.991
Federalism -7.639 20.000 0.703 -47.145 31.866
Multiple R 0.883
R Square 0.779
Standard Error 0.776
Observations 159
Summary Statistics of Continuous Variables
GI1\l0O0
Mean 359.6415
Standard Error 14.98858
Median 374
Mode 362
Standard Deviation 188.9988
Sample Variance 35720.55
Kurtosis -1.08053
Skewness -0.06037
Range 727
Minimum 40
Maximum 767
Sum 57183
Count 159
HDIxIOOO
Mean 709.0063
Standard Error 12.18223
Median 739
Mode 579
Standard Deviation 153.6121
Sample Variance 23596.68
Kurtosis -0.76922
Skewness -0.46124
Range 597
Minimum 352
Maximum 949
Sum 112732
Count 159
Moving from a large-n approach to a case study approach also yields no general
conclusions about the impact of federalism (ie, constitutionally mandated devolution of
powers to subnational units) on gender equality. If we look at the history of federalism
in particular countries, we find no consistent pattern of whether greater federalism helps
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or hurts women.33 Federal systems vary in terms of which level of government tends to
be more favourable on women's issues.3 4 And, even within a single country, the impact
of federalism on gender equality can change over time.35
In short, neither abstract theory nor statistics nor historical experience indicates any
general relationship between federalism and gender equality. Federalism in general is
neither good nor bad for gender equality. Asking about the general relationship between
these two is, I believe, asking the wrong question. Instead, we need to be asking about
which specific aspects of federalism tend to promote (or hinder) gender equality under
which specific conditions. 36 Only this much more fine-grained approach holds any hope
of generating useful conclusions. And such conclusions are urgently needed by women
who are seeking to respond (or contribute) to federalism reforms in their countries. They
need to know what kind of federalism and which specific federal mechanisms they should
support or oppose in order to serve their ultimate goal of promoting gender equality.
IV A DESIGN APPROACH TO FEDERALISM AND GENDER EQUALITY
When the question is reframed in this way, the experience of a range of countries can be
used to generate some useful conclusions about the types of federal arrangements that
can promote gender equality under specific circumstances. Each element on the list
provided in this section is intended to raise a series of specific questions to guide those
hoping to create a woman-friendly form of federalism. The elements on this list
generally do not prescribe specific institutions or constitutional provisions; instead they
direct attention to particular issues, which may require different approaches under
different circumstances. The list provided is a summary of the design elements
33 See Haussman, Sawer and Vickers, above n 13, 229-36 (assessing the impact of federalism,
devolution, and multilevel governance on women from the case studies in edited volume
and finding a mixed picture on all fronts).
34 Cf Laura Macdonald and Lisa Mills, 'Gender, Democracy and Federalism in Mexico:
Implications for Reproductive Rights and Social Policy' in Haussman, Sawer and Vickers,
above n 13; Chappell, above n 12; Bashevkin, above n 12 (all providing examples where states
are ahead of the federal government on gender equality reforms); Sabine Lang, 'Gendering
Federalism-Federalizing Gender: Women's Agencies and Policies in German Multilevel
Governance' (2010) 33 German Studies Review 517, 524; Laura Macdonald and Lisa Mills,
'Gender, Democracy and Federalism in Mexico: Implications for Reproductive Rights and
Social Policy' in Haussman, Sawer and Vickers, above n 13, 194-5 (providing examples where
states rolled back federal government reforms).
35 For an argument that federalism was only briefly an advantage for women's reproductive
rights, see Melissa Haussman, 'Caught in a Bind: The US Pro-Choice Movement and
Federalism' in Haussman, Sawer and Vickers above n 13, 123 ('With reference to the
questions posed to all authors about federalism and multilevel governance, the answer is that
the architecture of federalism only worked briefly to promote women's reproductive
freedom in the US, while there was political will to implement it and money to support it.').
36 And this is, in fact, the question that many gender scholars have come to focus on: see Vickers,
above n 21, 'A Two-Way Street: Federalism and Women's Politics in Canada and the United
States', 419-20 ('Many contemporary gender scholars (Sawer and Vickers 2001; Chappell
2002; Riedle 2002; Smith 2008; Vickers 2008) adopt a third, "conditional approach" (Gray
2006) that federalism per se has neither positive nor negative consequences for women
because federal characteristics and their effects vary between institutions, across institutional
arenas, and policy or issue sectors, and with time and space. They claim, therefore, that
federalism's effects depend on characteristics of specific federations, at specific times.').
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highlighted by the current literature on federalism and gender equality. It is, therefore,
only a first step in identifying a menu of issues for drafters to consider, not an exhaustive
catalogue. My hope is to stimulate discussion that will generate additional elements to
add to the list.
A Subject Matter Areas of State/Union Authority Should Not Track Culturally
Defined Gender Roles
In some federal countries, the division of powers between union and state governments
is similar in many ways to the division between culturally defined gender roles for men
and women. For example, in the US, family law is generally a subject of state authority
and not one on which the federal government directly legislates (although, of course,
federal laws can and do have a very large impact on families).3 7 To the extent that the
family is seen as the proper domain of women, this division of authority tracks the
traditional gender role categories. Such a division can be contrasted with, for example,
the Canadian federal arrangement in which different aspects of family law are controlled
by different levels of government: marriage and divorce law are a federal competence,
while adoption and disputes within marriage are handled under provincial law.38
Divisions of power between the levels of government that track traditional gender
role categories are problematic for women's equality for at least three reasons. First, such
divisions reinforce the idea that the traditional roles are natural, inevitable, and
necessary. 39 If the structures of government mirror the structures of gender, then it
becomes harder to get people to question the structure of gender roles. Second, if the
traditionally masculine roles are given to the union and the traditionally feminine ones
to the states, this is likely to reinforce the idea that feminine issues/concerns are less
7 See Sosna v Iowa, 419 US 393, 404 (1975); Ex Parte Burrus, 136 US 586, 593-4 (1890) ('The whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws
of the states, and not to the laws of the United States'; see also Barber v Barber, 60 US 582, 584
(1859). But see generally Judith Resnik, "'Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction,
and the Federal Courts' (1991) 66 New York University Law Review 1682 (challenging the
limited conception of family law, and noting that other areas of law touch directly on family
life); also see generally Ann Laquer Estin, 'Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and
the States' (2009) 18 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 267, 330 ('Many subjects of national
legislation incorporate significant family policy dimensions.').
38 Constitution Act 1867 (Imp), 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, ss 91-2 (giving the federal government exclusive
jurisdiction over Marriage and Divorce and provincial governments exclusive jurisdiction
over solemnisation of marriage, property and civil rights, and '[g]enerally all Matters of a
merely local or private Nature'); see also Christine Davies, Alastair Bissett-johnson and Julius
Grey, Family Law in Canada, (23 February 2015) The Canadian Encyclopaedia
<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/family-law/>.
39 See Resnik, "'Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts',
above n 37, 1696 ('What underlies both this lack of interest in and opposition to jurisdiction
over gender-related injuries is the usually unstated and widely shared assumption that
women are not relevant to the federal courts. This assumption, in turn, is fueled by an
association of women with roles traditionally governed by state law (marriage, childbearing,
and family care- oversimplified, a "private" world) and a corresponding association of the
federal courts not with such "domestic" concerns but rather with commerce, constitutional
law, federal statutory enforcement (oversimplified, a "public" world) in which men
predominate.').
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important. 40 In other words, the hierarchy implicit in federal arrangements -where
union governments are often seen as superior to and more powerful than state
governments -will support gender hierarchy. And third, if local authority is
concentrated in areas traditionally associated with women, it may increase the
likelihood that local cultural groups will see gender roles as a primary battle ground
with the majority culture and resist reforms.41 In most places, local cultural minorities
who might seek to exercise power under a federal system have a wide and rich range of
issues that distinguish them from the majority culture: language, religion, customs,
dress and food, property arrangements, and, of course, family structures and gender
roles. If the division of powers makes gender a salient category for local power, then that
is more likely to be the place where the battles for local autonomy will be fought. If the
division mixes things up, however - giving both levels of government powers related to
both masculine and feminine gender roles, decentring gender as a central category of
analysis - it may help avoid the dynamic where women's bodies and behaviour become
the central culturally contested terrain. For these reasons, it is likely that a federal
division of powers that tracks traditional gender roles could have damaging symbolic
effects on feminist reform efforts. 42
The guidance to avoid such a division of powers is not, of course, sufficient to
determine which competences should be assigned to each level of government. First,
this guideline cannot be translated directly to a list of areas that should always be given
to the states, or areas that should always be given to the union. Because cultures differ
in their views of traditional gender roles, the lists will be different in different places.
Moreover, avoiding a federal system that tracks gender roles can be achieved in many
different ways: there are many possible combinations of powers at each level that would
break up the gendered categories. Finally, the assignment of powers in a federal system
must answer to a long list of other important considerations beyond gender equality:
autonomy for local minority groups over things that matter to them, capacity of each
40 See ibid 1749 ('Women and the families they sometimes inhabit are not only assumed to be
outside the federal courts, they also are assumed not to be related to the "national issues" to
which the federal judiciary is to devote its interests. Jurisdictional lines have not been drawn
according to the laws of nature but by men, who today are seeking to confirm their prestige
as members of the most important judiciary in the country. Individual problems move lower
on the federal courts' agenda. Dealing with women-in and out of families, arguing about
federal statutory rights of relatively small value -is not how they want to frame their job.').
41 For a description of the development of this phenomenon and a suggestion about dividing
up jurisdiction over such issues in ways that defuse it, see Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural
Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
42 But it is important to recognise that the exact location and meaning of these dividing lines is
never fixed by a constitutional text: most exercises of government power will have
implications for multiple subjects, often on both sides of whatever line divides union and
state powers. For example, a policy about who counts as married for immigration purposes
concerns both the power over immigration and the power over marriage. Because of the
uncertainty and malleability of such boundaries, one of the most important issues in federal
systems is who will decide on which side of the line a particular exercise of power falls. This
is often the role of the Supreme Court or a specialised council. For a discussion of this line
drawing issue, see Judith Resnik, 'Federalism(s) Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-
Essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accommodations' in James E
Fleming and Jacob T Levy (eds), Federalism and Subsidiarity (New York University Press, 2014)
363.
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level of government to carry out different tasks, needs for coordination or unity to
achieve certain goals, etc.43 The point is not that gender equality trumps any one or more
of these concerns, but that it should be added to the list of goals that shape the division
of powers in a federal system. And, if gender equality is on that list, one of the central
questions that will need to be answered is whether a proposed division tracks gender
roles or not.
B Fiscal Arrangements Must Facilitate Rather than Frustrate Attention to Policy on
Women's Issues
Money matters to all forms of governance. And in a federal system, the division of
revenue raising powers and the potential for resource sharing across jurisdictions are
centrally important to the ability of each level of government to exercise its authority
and meet its obligations. If the federal system allocates many areas of concern to women
to state authority but fails to provide states with the ability to raise sufficient revenue to
carry out those tasks, then women's concerns will suffer. Because women are, on
average, poorer, less educated, and less able to access health care than men,44 it is Of
particular concern to them that the level of government charged with providing basic
services is adequately resourced. In other words, fiscal federalism, while important to
all citizens in a federal country, may be of particular concern to women and of particular
importance to the promotion of gender equality.45
In addition, from a gender equality perspective, it is also important to pay attention
to the possibility of resource and revenue sharing: either by redistributing federal
resources to the states or by redistributing resources from wealthier states to less
wealthy ones. Since women tend to be poorer and more in need of government services
for health and education, and since federalism will presumably entail moving greater
responsibility for some of those services to the state level, it is crucial that states with
fewer sources of revenue are supported by transfers that will allow them to meet these
responsibilities. One form of transfer raises particular issues, however: conditional
transfers by the central government to the states. When the money comes with strings
attached, it tends to reduce the ability of states to make their own policy judgments
about how to spend it.46 This can be good or bad for women, depending on whether the
central government or the states are likely to be more sympathetic to women's needs
and concerned about promoting gender equality. In short, a gender equality perspective
raises the question about the best balance between revenue sharing (which is general
43 See David C Williams, 'Constitutional Design for Burma: The First Lecture' in David C
Williams and Lian H Sakhong (eds), Designing Federalism in Burma (2005) 55, 73-90.
44 UN Women, Turning Promises into Action: Gender Equality in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development (2018), 20.
45 For similar reasons, women have a particularly strong interest in the inclusion of positive
rights to social and economic benefits in the constitution. See Susan Williams, 'Introduction:
Comparative Constitutional Law, Gender Equality, and Constitutional Design' in Susan H
Williams (ed), Constituting Equality: Gender Equality and Comparative Constitutional Law, above
n 2, 1.
46 Anwar Shah, 'Comparative Conclusions on Fiscal Federalism' in Anwar Shah (ed) The
Practice of Fiscal Federalism: Comparative Perspectives (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007)
370, 391 ('In most case study countries, with a few notable exceptions, federal conditional
grants use input-based conditionality. Such conditionality impairs state and local autonomy
and is a source of conflict.').
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and unconditional) and conditional transfer payments.47 The answer to that question
will vary in different countries (and perhaps in the same country at different times or on
different issues), but this is one factor that can affect how federalism contributes to
gender equality.
C Political Representation and Party Arrangements Must Increase Women's Voice
and Attention to Gender Issues
Federalism offers the possibility for changing the political system at the level of the state
in ways that will increase women's political representation and voice. In order to
maximise this potential, the constitution must allow the states to create electoral systems
that differ from the one used by the union government. On the subject of woman-
friendly electoral systems, there are some clear guidelines that can be gleaned from
global experience. Women's representation is higher in prop ortional representation (PR)
systems, as compared to majority/plurality systems (FPP).48 Women's representation is
increased even more by the ado tion of an electoral gender quota that works well with
the particular electoral system.4 Electoral funding is also an important variable. Women
candidates (who are less likely to be personally rich and less likely to have powerful
economic forces supporting them) are aided by campaign finance laws that limit the
impact of money on elections. 50 Public funding for electoral campaigns could also
reduce the resource strain of running the larger number of candidates required by a
federal system. In short, to the extent that a federal system allows for the possibility of
states adopting more woman-friendly political systems, it will help promote greater
gender equality.
Pushing power down to the state level also has the potential to shift the nature of
political parties in ways that might help or hurt women's equality. One result of
federalism may be a rise in (or an increase in power for) identity-based parties that have
a chance to win at the state level, even if they would be unable to compete effectively
47 See Robin Boadway and Anwar Shah, Fiscal Federalism: Principles and Practice of Multiorder
Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 291-391 (Chapters on Revenue Sharing and
Fiscal Transfers); regarding revenue sharing see 295 ('Standard revenue-sharing systems
provide transfers in a lump-sum and unconditional way to the states. The states are left with
full discretion over how to spend them.').
48 See Rob Salmond, 'Proportional Representation and Female Parliamentarians' (2006) 31(2)
Legislative Studies Quarterly 175, 190-2; (see also Pamela Paxton, Melanie M Hughes and
Matthew A Painter IL 'Growth in Women's Political Representation: A Longitudinal
Exploration of Democracy, Electoral System, and Gender Quotas' (2010) 49 European Journal
of Political Research 25, 43 ('Compared to plurality-majority systems, countries with PR or
mixed-PR systems consistently have significantly higher levels of women's political
representation.').
49 See Stina Laserud and Rina Taphorn, Designing for Equality: Best-Fit, Medium-Fit and Non-
Favourable Combinations of Electoral Systems and Gender Quotas (1 March 2007) International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
<https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/designing-equality-best-fit-medium-fit-
and-non-favourable-combinations>.
50 For a full analysis of these issues, see Lolita Cigane and Magnus Ohman, Political Finance and
Gender Equality (August 2014) International Foundation for Electoral Systems
<https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/political-financeand_gender-equality.pdf>.
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nationally.51 This development can be dangerous to women's equality if those parties
define their identities, in part, in terms of the maintenance of traditional gender roles.
But women's organisations can sometimes leverage identity politics to support gender
equality agendas. For example, women's groups in Quebec, Canada, have been very
effective at using Francophone identity politics as a basis for getting some of the most
supportive child care and maternity policies in the country.52 Whether this synergy is
possible is a question that will be answered differently in different contexts; the point
here is that the impact of federalisation on gender equality depends on variables like
whether women can build coalitions with identity-based parties or not.
D The Federal Structure Should Include Powerful Women's Policy Agencies at All
Levels of Government and Facilitate Coordination Among Them
One of the more effective mechanisms for promoting women's equality is a strong
women's policy agency as part of government (eg, a Ministry, Commission, or Bureau
devoted to gender equality issues). 3 Such a body can be tasked with a variety of projects
that will support the equality agenda: research into the causes and nature of gender
inequality in the particular jurisdiction, formulation of policy proposals to address it,
gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting to assess proposed laws and regulations,
and public education. 54 Federalism complicates the operation of such an agency,
however. In a federal system, women's policy agencies must exist at all levels of the
government- state (and, possibly, local) as well as union-because law and policy
affecting women will be made at all these levels. In order to be effective in this more
complex system, these agencies must be networked in a way that allows them to share
information and coordinate their activities. 55 There is also good evidence that such
51 Cf, William M Chandler and Marsha A Chandler, 'Federalism and Political Parties' (1987) 3
European Journal of Political Economy 87, 87-8 (describing how federalism facilitates the
formation and strength of 'regionalist' parties). For an interesting description of how federal
systems in Asia create a role for ethnic parties at the sub-state level, see Michael G Breen,
'Federalism and the Role of Multiethnic Political Parties in the Accommodation of Minority
Ethnic Groups in Asia' (Paper presented at IPSA World Congress, Brisbane, Australia, July
2018) <https://www.ipsa.org/sites/default/files/ipsa-events/wc2018/papers/paper-
102651-2018-07-16t213946-0400.pdf>.
52 Rianne Mahon and Cheryl Collier, 'Navigating the Shoals of Canadian Federalism: Childcare
Advocacy', in Haussman, Sawer and Vickers, above n 13, 51, 65.
53 See Dorothy E McBride and Amy G Mazur, 'Women's Policy Agencies and State Feminism',
in Georgina Waylen et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics (Oxford University
Press, 2013) 654, 672 ('This chapter has shown the various ways women's policy agencies
through state feminism are important sites of representation, policy change, and ultimately
democratization.'); 669 ('the analysis confirmed the significant independent influence of
agencies on state response to movement demands.').
54 For a comprehensive exposition of the forms and functions of Women's Policy Agencies of
151 countries worldwide, see generally Christine Scheidegger, Institutional Architecture for
Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality Worldwide (2014)
<https://www.academia.edu/9314562/Institutional-architectureforwomens-empower
mentand-genderequality worldwide Institutional diversity-inj151_countries>.
55 For a good example of such effective networking, see Lang, above n 34, 519 ('Nearly 1,900
local Women's Equality Offices work in cities and counties, networking through their
national association the Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft kommunaler Frauenbtiros (BAG). They
frequently cooperate with equality officers in parties, universities, and large private
businesses.').
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policy agencies are improved by keeping a close connection to civil society women's
organisations with strong grass-roots support.5 6 One goal of women involved in the
creation of a federal system should be the creation of such strong agencies at each level
of government and the provision of resources and incentives to keep them connected to
each other and to civil society organisations.
E Intergovernmental Mechanisms Must Include Women's Voices and Be Open to
Women's Influence
In a federal system, where decisions are made by both union and state governments,
there is a need for communication and coordination between the different levels of
government and between the multiple states. Without such coordination, there is
tremendous potential for conflicting or competing policies that will reduce effective
governance. As a result, most federal systems have a variety of intergovernmental
mechanisms to facilitate communication and coordination. These range from
associations to bring together executive officials from different states and the union for
consultation (eg, First Minister's Meetings in Canada, 5 7 the National Development
Council in India,58 or the Council of Governors in the US), to bodies to deal with natural
resource and environmental issues that cross state boundaries (eg, Interstate River
Tribunals in India), 59 to bodies primarily for sharing information and ideas and
mobilising political influence (eg, the Conference of Mayors in the US).
In many cases, these bodies are less formal, and less subject to democratic political
controls, than official government bodies. 60 And because they tend to draw their
members from among current officeholders (particularly in executive branch positions),
they often have few women members. As a result, women's voices-whether as
participants or as constituent watch-dogs-may be weak in intergovernmental
mechanisms. 61 Thus, women involved in transitions to federalism should raise
questions about the structure and openness of these important institutions. For example,
women might push for more formal structures that include gender quotas for the
membership, or inclusion of members from civil society. Or they might insist on public
access to information about the activities of the body or a public right to submit
information to the body. In thinking about how federalism will work for women, it is
important not to ignore these institutions.
F The Federal Structure Should Facilitate Global-to-Local Interactions, Which Are
a Fruitful Source of Energy, Ideas, and Resources for Gender Reform
Finally, one of the interesting effects of federalism may be to create an opening for
greater global-to-local interactions, which can, in turn, be an important impetus for
56 See McBride and Mazur, above n 53, 669.
57 See Government of Canada, Intergovernmental Relations in the Canadian Context (2018)
<htps://www.canada.ca/en/intergovernmental-affairs/services/relations-canadian-
context.html>.
58 See Chanchal Kumar Sharma, 'Intergovernmental Coordination Mechanisms in India: A
Review' (2011) 15(2) South Asian Journal of Socio-Political Studies 40.
59 Ibid.
60 See Johanne Poirier, Cheryl Saunders and John Kincaid (eds), Intergovernmental Relations in
Federal Systems (Oxford University Press, 2015).
61 See Gwen Gray, 'Women, Federalism and Woman-Friendly Policies' (2006) 65 Australian
Journal of Public Administration 34.
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gender equality reform. When power is decentralised to state and/or local governments,
those governments may wish to develop relationships with governments outside of the
country. Such relationships can take many forms, eg sister cities, states seeking to sign
international human rights conventions that the nation as a whole has not signed, states
developing cultural and economic exchange programs with foreign countries. 62 This
sort of transnational contact or influence has been a potent catalyst for feminist reform
in many places. 63 For example, feminist organisations in Latin America have supported
each other across country lines to bring cases to the InterAmerican Court of Human
Rights advancing women's equality.> It is in the interest of women for the form of
federalism to allow, or even encourage, these cross-national linkages and the influence
of international law.
There are a variety of ways to build a supportive environment for these connections
into the federal structure. For example, tertiar% federalism- including constitutional
protection for a third, local layer of government - can help to strengthen the ability of
cities to engage in transnational connections. It would also be possible to explicitly
authorise states to have certain kinds of relations with foreign governments, such as
cultural exchange and economic development ties, in the list of state powers in the
federal constitution. 66 And the federal system could allow states to write their own
constitutions and to incorporate international law into them, either as an interpretive
62 For a description of the range of such connections, see Judith Resnik, 'Law's Migration:
American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry' (2006)
115 Yale Law Journal 1564, 1647-52.
63 See Julie C Suk, 'An Equal Rights Amendment for the Twenty-First Century: Bringing Global
Constitutionalism Home' (2017) 28 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 381 (discussing the
convergence between foreign models of gender equality and US state and local efforts to
adopt stronger equal protection models than at the federal level).
64 See Christiana Ochoa, 'Guatemalan Transnational Feminists: How Their Search for
Constitutional Equality Interplays with International Law', in Susan H Williams (ed),
Constituting Equality: Gender Equality and Comparative Constitutional Law, above n 2, 248.
65 See, Nico Steytler, 'Comparative Conclusions', in Nico Steytler and John Kincaid (eds), Local
Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal Systems (McGill-Queen's University Press,
2009) 406-11.
66 This could be an important addition to clarify state's capabilities, given that the foreign affairs
power is almost always assigned to the central government in federal systems. See, eg,
Grundgesetz (Basic Law) ch II art 32 s 3, translation at <https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch gg/index.html> ('Insofar as the Lander have power to legislate, they
may conclude treaties with the consent of the Federal Government'); see also
Bundesverfassungsgesetz [B-VG ][Constitution] BGBL No 1/1930, as last amended by
Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBL I No 102/2014 art 10(3),
<https://ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1930_1/ERV_1930_1.html> (Austria)
('Before the Federation concludes state treaties which make necessary implementing
measures in the sense of art 16 or affect the autonomous sphere of competence of the
provinces in another way it must give the provinces the opportunity to give their opinion. If
the Federation is in possession of a uniform opinion of the provinces, the Federation is bound
thereby when concluding the state treaty. The Federation may depart therefrom only for
compelling foreign policy reasons; it shall without delay advise the provinces of these
reasons.').
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aid67or as part of state law. 68 A federal system that recognises and supports these global
connections is likely to be more open to gender equality reforms.
V APPLYING THIS APPROACH TO MYANMAR
The current peace process in Myanmar is primarily focused on federalism issues. The
conflict in this country, which has been going on for over fifty years, has its roots in the
resistance of Burma's ethnic minority groups to dominance by the Burman majority. 69
During the period of military dictatorship, from 1962 until the adoption of the 2008
Constitution and the elections in 2010, the military government pursued a consistent
policy of destruction of minority ethnic cultures and peoples. The military offensives
against the ethnic groups targeted civilian populations and led to massive numbers of
refugees and internally displaced people.70 During this period, the teaching of ethnic
minority languages was banned, the religious freedom of the many non-Buddhists in
some of the ethnic groups was restricted, and the government adopted an explicit policy
of 'Burmanization'.7 1 Although all of the people in Burma suffered under the military
regime, the ethnic minorities were distinctively oppressed and they have been at the
centre of the armed resistance.
Once the new Constitution was adopted and elections were held, the (nominally
civilian) government and the military began a process of negotiation with the armed
resistance groups. Several of these groups signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
(NCA) and there is an ongoing process of dialogue through Union Peace Conferences
(held on a somewhat erratic schedule) that is intended to result in a Comprehensive
Peace Accord (CPA) that will end the civil war.72 Since the 2015 elections, in which
67 As in the South African Constitution, see Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1996
(South Africa) art 39(1) ('When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum ...
must consider international law ... '), art 233 ('When interpreting any legislation, every court
must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international
law.').
68 As in the Costa Rican Constitution, see art 7 (1949, rev 2011) ('The public treaties, the
international agreements and the concordats, duly approved by the Legislative Assembly,
will have from their promulgation or from the day designated by them, authority superior to
that of the laws.'),
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa Rica_2011.pdf?lang=en>.
69 See David C Williams, 'Changing Burma From Without: Political Activism Among the
Burmese Diaspora' (2012) 19 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 121, 124-7.
70 See John Bray, 'Ethnic Minorities and the Future of Burma' (1992) 48 The World Today 144, 144
('This year the Burmese army has launched offensives against Karen, Kachin, Naga and
Rohingya insurgents ... Burma's civil war is an international issue as much as a domestic one
... because of the flood of refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries.'); see ibid 126-
7.
71 Josef Silverstein, Burmese Politics: The Dilemma of National Unity (Rutgers University Press,
1980) 51 ('What moved them [the ethnic minorities] were their common fears of
Burmanization, loss of cultural identity, interference in their affairs by the national
government and a belief that the Burmans were creating an internal colonial system in which
they would not share the wealth of the country.').
72 For a description of the history of the peace process, see Myanmar's Peace Process: Getting
to a Political Dialogue, Briefing Paper #149, International Crisis Group (19 October 2016) at
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power shifted, the government negotiators have represented the National League for
Democracy (NLD) party, under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyii, but the army
remains a third partner in the negotiations and is effectively independent of the control
of the civilian government. Meanwhile, some of the most important armed groups are
not yet parties to the NCA and fighting continues in Kachin and Shan states,73 along
with the military attacks on the Rohyinga in Rakhine state, which have received more
international attention. 74 In short, the transition to a democratically elected, civilian
government has not ended the war in Myanmar: the current peace process is difficult
and imperfect, but it is still the greatest hope for an end to the longest running civil war
in the world.
The ethnic groups who have been fighting for decades have never been fighting only
for democracy: simple majoritarian democracy will not prevent their oppression. Their
struggle has always been for sufficient autonomy to guarantee them self-government. 75
In the past, many believed that only secession and the formation of their own countries
would achieve this goal-and some still believe this.76 But the current peace process -
in which a number of the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) are in dialogue with the
government and the army -is an effort to find a form of federalism that will provide
them with sufficient self-determination to feel safe within the nation of Myanmar and
end the conflict. Thus, the central issue in the peace negotiations is federalism. Our
Center for Constitutional Democracy has been advising the ethnic nationality groups for
over 17 years. We have worked with them to develop constitutional solutions that could
help them achieve federalism and peace. The question now is whether the current peace
process will succeed in adopting the constitutional changes necessary to bring an end to
the war.7 7
<htps://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-s-peace-
process-getting-political-dialogue>.
7 See Oliver Slow, 'Fighting in Kachin Highlights Myanmar Civil War Worries', Voice of
America (online), 26 April 2018, <htps://www.voanews.com/a/kachin-fighting-myanmar-
civil-war/4365603.html>; 'Myanmar: 19 Die in Fresh Gashes Between Army and Rebels in
Shan State, The Guardian (online), 12 May 2018,
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/12/myanmar-19-die-in-fresh-clashes-
between-army-and-rebels-in-shan-state>.
74 For a sampling of the extensive press coverage of the Rohyinga crisis, see 'Myanmar
Rohingya: What You Need to Know About the Crisis', BBC News (online), 24 April 2018,
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561>; 'The Rohyinga Crisis', CNN,
<https://www.cnn.com/specials/asia/rohingya>; Eleanor Albert, 'The Rohyinga Crisis',
Council on Foreign Relations, 20 April 2018 <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-
crisis>.
75 See David C Williams, 'Constitutionalism Before Constitutions: Burma's Struggle to Build a
New Order', (2009) 87 Texas Law Journal 1657, 1660.
76 See Christina Fink, Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule (Zed Books, 2001) 28 (describing
the history of secession claims); David C Williams, 'Changing Burma From Without: Political
Activism Among the Burmese Diaspora' above n 69, 1673 (describing how some groups still
seek secession).
77 For a discussion of how the CPA can make constitutional change, see David C Williams, 'Can
the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar Be Changed Outside the
Legislature and Outside the Normal Amendment Process?' (unpublished paper on file with
the author).
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At the same time, women in Myanmar suffer from systematic gender inequality, as
in much of the rest of the world. Women have been particular victims of the civil war,
in which rape has been used as a tool of 'ethnic cleansing' by the military in some areas.78
Women face discrimination in education 79 and employment 8 0 and are massively
underrepresented in political office.81 The women's organisations with whom I have
worked, particularly the Women's League of Burma (WLB), 82 care about the federalism
issues in the same way and for the same reasons as their male ethnic colleagues. But they
have an additional set of concerns, as well. First, they want women's voices to be part of
the decision-making process on constitutional reform. Currently, very few of the
decision makers in the peace process are women.8 3 Second, they want to make sure that
federalism is adopted in a way that benefits women as well as men. They do not want
power shifted to state governments, only to discover that those governments have no
women in them and little concern about the needs and desires of women. And third,
they want the process of constitutional reform to pay attention to the gender
78 See eg, Katya Cengel, 'Rape is a Weapon in Burma's Kachin State, but the Women of Kachin
Are Fighting Back', Time (online), 11 February 2014, <http://time.com/6429/burma-rape-in-
kachin/>; Rick Gladstone, 'Rohingya Were Raped Systematically by Myanmar's Military,
Report Says', New York Times (online), 16 November 2017
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-rapes.html>.
79 While women are actually more likely to have higher education than men in Burma, there is
overt discrimination to keep them out of certain subjects in universities. See Samantha
Michaels, 'Sun Kyi Criticizes Gender Bias at Burma Universities', The Irrawaddy (online), 6
December 2013, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/suu-kyi-criticizes-gender-
bias-burma-universities.html>.
80 For a comprehensive assessment of the status of women in Myanmar, see Gender Equality
and Women's Rights in Myanmar: A Situation Analysis (Report by Asian Development Bank,
United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Population Fund, and the United
Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women) (2016)
<htp://mm.one.un.org/content/dam/unct/myanmar/docs/unct-mm-UNWomenRepo
rt_Gender% 20Situation% 20Analysis.pdf>.
81 See statistics on pp 28-9.
82 The WLB is an umbrella organisation, bringing together representatives from the many
women's groups that are associated with particular ethnicities in Burma. It includes women's
groups from both ethnic minority and majority (Burman) communities. It was based in
Chiang Mai, Thailand for many years during the military junta, but has recently moved its
headquarters inside the country, to Yangon. The WLB, because of its close ties to ethnic
groups and its history of refugee leadership, has a special concern for the women impacted
by the civil war and sees its role in the peace process as one of its central priorities. For more
information about the organisation, see <http://womenofburma.org/aboutus/>.
83 With a female representation of only 17 percent, women accounted for 120 out of the 700
delegates at the most recent UPC, 40 of them being lawmakers or government officials, eight
being members of the Tatmadaw, 28 representing the political parties, 31 coming from the
EAOs, and 13 acting as civilian representatives. See Nyein Nyein, 'Women Playing Larger
Role at This Year's Peace Conference', The Irrawaddy (online), 15 July 2018,
<htps://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/women-playing-larger-role-years-peace-
conference.html>. Female underrepresentation has been even more severe on the UPDJC
(one of the central decision-making bodies in the peace process), where, at least as of 2017,
only eight out of 75 members were women. Roslyn Warren et al 'Women's Peacebuilding
Strategies Amidst Conflict: Lessons from Myanmar and Ukraine' (Georgetown Institute for
Women, Peace and Security, 2018) <htps://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/Womens-Peacebuilding-Strategies-Amidst-Conflict-1.pdf>.
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implications of the changes contemplated. They want gender equality to be one of the
goals of the reforms and fully part of the analysis, rather than simply added on as
window dressing.84
The focus of the remainder of this paper is on the second concern: making sure that
Burma gets a form of federalism that promotes gender equality rather than hindering it
(or simply failing to help with it). Using the list of issues generated in the prior section,
this part of the paper will summarise a few of the more important ways that a concern
for gender equality might lead to particular forms of federalism in Burma and to a
particular agenda for the women's groups that are trying to participate in the peace
process. This is not an exhaustive analysis of a woman-friendly form of federalism for
Burma: there are many additional issues and details that would need to be filled in to
provide such a complete case study.8 5 Instead, this is simply an illustration of the
usefulness of the guidelines offered in the earlier section of this paper. The major
conclusion of this section will be that there is substantial overlap between the goals of
feminists and the goals of ethnic armed groups in terms of the types of federalism they
want and that they could work together for certain specific federal arrangements. But
there are also some issues of concern to women that are unlikely to be prioritised by the
EAOs and on which groups like the WLB will need to focus and mobilise independently.
A State Powers
The division of powers between the union and state governments in the current
Constitution of the Republic of Myanmar gives few important powers to the states.86
One of the central negotiating issues in the peace process is the transfer of some of the
union powers to state governments. The analysis in the last section suggests that, in these
negotiations, gender equality will be benefitted if the powers given to the states do not
track gender roles and stereotypes. Some of the areas of competence that the ethnic
nationalities want transferred to state power might raise this concern about the
'feminisation' of state powers. For example, because they are concerned to preserve their
ethnic cultures, they would like the states to have control over education, culture, and
language.87 But the ethnic nationality groups also want the state governments to control
natural resources and economic development within their borders and they want state
governments to have the power to create and maintain their own security forces (eg
militias and police). These are, of course, much more controversial claims of state power
and will be harder to achieve through the negotiating process. But, if the states got these
sorts of powers, the division of powers between state and union would be much less
likely to reflect traditional gender roles. This analysis suggests that activists concerned
about creating a form of federalism friendly to gender equality should support the ethnic
84 The first and third of these goals are not addressed in this paper. For a discussion of these
concerns, please see the 'WLB Response to the Gender Equality Principles Adopted at the
UPC in August 2018 (paper on file with the author).
85 For an interesting effort offering some of the details about specific divisions of power and
reaching similar conclusions on some issues, see Forster, above n 3.
86 Cf Myanmar Constitution 2008 sch 1 with sch 2.
87 This claim, and others in this section of the paper describing the positions of the EACs in the
peace negotiations, are based on my years of working with these groups on constitutional
reform issues. There are few publicly available sources on the positions of the parties in the
peace negotiations, but our Center has been talking to the leaders of these groups for over a
decade and those conversations are the basis for my descriptions of their positions.
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nationalities' demands for the transfer of these sorts of powers to state governments. A
form of federalism in which states have power over resources, development and
security - along with education, health and culture - is a common goal for feminists and
ethnic nationalities.
B Resource and Revenue Sharing
Another of the difficult issues on the negotiating table concerns the distribution of
revenues from natural resource development and from general taxes. Currently, the vast
majority of the revenue flows to the union government. The union government controls
all natural resource development8 8 and, indeed, large economic development of every
kind.89 As a result, the ethnic minorities have seen very little of the benefit of such
development, despite the fact that most of the natural resources are located in the states
where the ethnic minority populations live. The union also controls all of the major
sources of tax revenues. 90 As a result, shifting powers to the state governments will be
useless unless there is also a shift in the revenues to support the exercise of such powers.
The EAOs in the peace negotiations have, therefore, also raised the issue of adding to
the Constitution a shared revenue scheme that will give them a guaranteed percentage
of the money generated both by taxes and by development. 91 As discussed earlier, the
financial ability of state governments to carry out their responsibilities for social welfare
projects is of particular concern to women and of particular importance to promoting
gender equality. So, again, this is an area of common ground where women's groups
and others concerned about equality issues could add support to the claims by ethnic
minority groups for greater state revenues.
In addition, one of the issues on which the different ethnic states are not in agreement
concerns the extent to which revenue from natural resource development should be
shared among all the states or remain in the state where the resource was located.
Because some of Burma's states are very resource rich (eg, natural gas in Rakhine State,
jade in Kachin State) while others have few exploitable resources (eg, Chin State and
Karenni State), they have very different interests on this subject. Most of the ethnic
representatives in the peace process agree that there should be some redistribution of
such revenues in the interest of equalisation across states, but there is no consensus
about how much of the revenues should be used in this way. Women's groups and
others concerned about equality (including, but not limited to, gender equality) could
88 See Myanmar Constitution 2008 art 37 ('The Union is the ultimate owner of all lands and all
natural resources above and below the ground, above and beneath the water and in the
atmosphere in the Union ... ').
89 Myanmar Constitution 2008 sch 1.
90 See ibid.
91 They would also like a greater role in the design and implementation of tax and development
schemes, particularly with respect to the natural resources located within their borders. In
other words, they do not just want a share of the profits, they also want to be able to ensure
that the programs are carried out in ways that respect the customs and community identities
of their people. For example, they would like to prevent the government from destroying
intact communities and scattering their population in order to build dams. See, eg, 'Myanmar
Urged to Review Hydropower Dam Projects Seen Damaging to Rural Communities', Radio
Free Asia (online), 10 July 2018, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/myanmar-
urged-to-review-hydropower-dam-projects-07102018170207.html>.
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be useful in bringing the ethnic states together if they entered this debate and pressed
for larger equalisation funds.
C Electoral Law and Party Politics
Women suffer from low political representation at all levels in the government of
Myanmar. In the national Parliament, as of the 2015 elections, there are 23 women in the
upper house and 44 in the lower house. This represents a total of 13.7% of all elected
MPs. When the military-appointed MPs are added (25% of every legislative body),92 the
female percentage is 10.5% of all MPs. In the state/region level parliaments, 84 women
were elected in 2015, bringing the female percentage of elected representatives to 12.7%
and the female percentage of total MPs (including the military appointees) to 9.7%.93
Moreover, currently, the structure and electoral system for state governments is
specified in the union-level Constitution. That structure calls for a first-past-the-post
electoral system for the state legislatures as well as the national one and fails to include
any form of gender quota.94
One of the central demands of the ethnic groups negotiating in the peace process has
been for states to have the power to write their own state constitutions. These groups
want the states to be able to choose a form of government and an electoral system
different from the national government. There are many good reasons to allow the states
to make these choices for themselves - and to make different choices from the union95 -
but one of those reasons is to promote gender equality. If the states can choose their own
systems, some of them might choose a proportional representation electoral system,
which would be likely to lead to more women in the state legislature. Some states might
also choose to adopt explicit gender quotas to guarantee a certain level of representation
to women. Indeed, some of the draft state constitutions on which people have been
working for over a decade include both of these elements. 96
If the states have no power to write their own constitutions, there will be no chance
for greater representation for women until and unless the union Constitution is changed
in these ways. And under current conditions, such a change at the national level is
unlikely. A change to a proportional representation system would reduce the majority
premium currently enjoyed by the NLD party and so is not favoured by the
92 See Myanmar Constitution 2008 arts 141(b) (Upper House), 109(b) (Lower House), 161(d) (state
and region legislatures).
93 See Shwe Shwe Sein Latt et al, 'Women's Political Representation in Myanmar: Experiences
of Women Parliamentarians 2011-16' (Asia Foundation, 2017) vol ii.
94 See Myanmar Constitution 2008 arts 109(a), 141n(a)(national), 161(a)(state); 'Myanmar Election
Guide, Democracy Assistance and Election News'
<https://www.google.com/search?cient=firefox-b-1-ab&ei=YgrCW6-
cEYm6ggfvnJaoCg&q=PR+electoral+system+in+Amyotha+Hluttaw&oq=PR+electoral+syst
em+in+Amyotha+Hfluttaw&gs_1=psy-
ab.3...28667.33422..34306...0.0..0.134.409.3j1.0....1..gws-wiz.......0i71.MqDcbEX4k3s>.
95 Most of these reasons have to do with the differences between the states in terms of size and
diversity and their ability to design governing structures that fit their specific characteristics.
These reasons would, of course, benefit women in the states along with their male
counterparts. The point in text is simply that women have an additional reason to support
the ability of states to write their own constitutions: it gives them a chance to create more
woman-friendly conditions in the electoral systems of their states than the system required
by the current union Constitution.
96 See state constitution drafts on file with the author.
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government. 9 7 And Aung San Suu Kyi has been consistently opposed to gender
quotas.98 As a result, the best hope for an increase in women's political representation
in the near future lies in the ossibility of states writing constitutions that make different
choices on these subjects.9 Again, this is an area where women's organisations and
others concerned about gender equality can make common cause with the ethnic
nationalities in the current peace negotiations.
The situation with respect to the character of political parties may also present
opportunities. There are ethnically based parties in many of the states and, if the power
of state government increases, then it is likely that those parties will play a significant
role in some of the state governments. The women's movement has also been organised
largely (although not completely) around ethnic identity. For example, the member
organisations of the WLB include the Burmese Women's Union, the Karen Women's
Organization, the Shan Women's Action Network, and several other groups identified
with particular ethnic groups.10 0 The question then is whether women's organisations
can form alliances with ethnic political parties in which the women's support is not
simply taken for granted, but instead reciprocated by adoption of woman-friendly
policies by the parties. The women's groups may need to demonstrate both the
usefulness of their support-for example, in terms of getting out the vote-and their
willingness to shift their support to a different party if they are not given certain policy
commitments. Under current circumstances, this would be difficult, because the need
for ethnic solidarity is so powerful in the peace process that there is no credible threat of
shifting support. But, if the federalism agenda makes progress, this kind of bargaining
may become easier within the context of a newly powerful state politics freed from the
bipolar orientation (Burman/ethnic minority) that has dominated ethnic politics.
D Intergovernmental Mechanisms and Women's Policy Agencies
These two aspects are less useful to women in the present situation in Myanmar and will
probably not provide a significant opportunity for shaping the constitutional
negotiations. The policy agencies for women's affairs/gender equality are currently
quite weak in Myanmar. At the union level, the Myanmar National Committee for
Women's Affairs is chaired by the Minister of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement.
This body does not have the status or resources of a Ministry. Instead, it is a policy-
making mechanism that is intended to advise the Ministries and government on issues
of concern to women. One measure of the insufficient commitment to gender equality is
that the Minister chairing the Committee is a man: Dr Win Myat Aye.101 The National
97 See Nicole Loring, Political Twist: A Combined Electoral System in Myanmar (December 2014),
<http://www.academia.edu/9676238/PoliticalTwist_A_CombinedElectoralSystem-in_
Myanmar>.
98 'NLD Won't Support Quota for Women in Political Positions', The Irrawaddy (online), 3 July
2018, <htps://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/nld-wont-support-quota-for-women-
in-political-positions.html>.
99 Devolving power to the states might also give them more control over the structures and
electoral rules of local governments. Under current law in Myanmar, Ward and Village Tract
Administrators, who are important local officials, are elected not by all citizens, but only by
heads of households (who are presumed to be men). As a result, women neither vote for nor
hold these positions. See Forster, above n 3, 15.
100 See Women's League of Burma website <http://womenofburma.org/wlbmembers/>.
101 Indeed, Aung San Suu Kyi has appointed no women to cabinet posts since her party won the
2015 elections. See Fiona Macgregor, 'Myanmar's New Cabinet: National Reconciliation
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Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women 2013-2022 (NASPAW), is the primary
policy guideline for the work of the Committee, and the government in general, on
gender equality issues. The plan is based on the priority areas from the Beijing Platform
for Action, including livelihoods and poverty reduction, education and training, health,
halting violence against women, emergencies/armed conflict, economy, decision-
making, institutional mechanisms, human rights, media, environment and the child.102
There has been little policy activity to implement the plan. In addition to the Committee,
there is the Myanmar Women's Affairs Federation, a government-funded and staffed
nongovernment organisation, and the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare
Association, which promotes maternal and child health in remote areas of the
country.103 There are few if any women's policy agencies at the state or local levels of
government. Women's policy agencies are unlikely to be a topic considered in the peace
process so this is not an area for focus at this time. But, once state governments are given
more extensive powers and resources, it will be important to push for the creation of a
network of policy agencies that can be a more effective engine for gender equality
reform.
Similarly, there are few intergovernmental bodies currently operating in Myanmar.
There is little need for them under the present conditions, when state governments
function largely as arms of the union government. If the federalism agenda makes
progress, then this need will grow and there may well be bodies created to meet it. For
example, if the peace negotiations yield some form of shared competence over natural
resources, then there will need to be a body to coordinate between state and union
governments over this issue. At that point, it will be necessary to consider how such a
body can be constituted in a way that promotes gender equality. As discussed earlier,
the goals would be both to guarantee women's participation and to ensure that the body
is open to public scrutiny.
E International Law and Global/Local Cooperation
The most likely mechanism for increasing the powers of local governments and for
incorporating international law into the domestic legal system in Myanmar is, again, the
writing of state constitutions. If states have the power to write their own constitutions,
with structures and rules different from the union, then some of them will certainly
choose to create local governments with some guaranteed powers. Indeed, the current
conversations about state constitutions in many places in Burma are focused on the need
for local autonomy to accommodate the ethnic diversity within many of the states.104
Some states may also choose to include references to international law or constitutional
principles from other systems as part of their own domestic legal system. As discussed
above, both of these moves could be helpful to the promotion of gender equality. So,
Without Equality, Myanmar Times (online), 25 March 2016
<htps://www.mmtimes.com/opinion/19660-myanmar-s-new-cabinet-national-
reconciliation-without-equality.html>.
102 See Sam Yamin Aung, 'Social Welfare Minister: "I will always campaign for gender
equality"', The Irrawaddy, 8 March 2017.
103 For the former, see <http://www.mwaf.org.mm/en/about-us>, for the latter, see
<htp://www.mmcwa-myanmar.org/>.
104 This observation is based on my own work with state constitution drafters in Shan State and
Tanintharyi Region in May and August of 2018.
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once again, this analysis suggests that those concerned about this goal should support
the demand for states to have the power to draft their own constitutions.
In short, the type of federalism that is likely to promote gender equality in Myanmar
is a form that includes: (1) more extensive state powers that are culturally coded as both
feminine (eg, education and culture) and masculine (eg, economic development and
security), (2) a substantial increase in revenues flowing to state governments and under
their control, (3) a more equal distribution of the benefits of natural resource
development across the different states, and (4) an extensive power in the states to write
their own constitutions. If some of these federalism reforms can be achieved, then the
door will be opened to further changes to improve gender equality. Some of those later
changes would be at the state level, such as the adoption of proportional representation
electoral systems and electoral gender quotas, the creation of strong women's policy
agencies, and the incorporation of international human rights standards into state law.
Other changes might be at the union level, such as the design of intergovernmental
bodies to facilitate cooperation that are open to women. If this form of federalism can be
created in Myanmar, then it has the potential to promote the long-term goal of gender
equality.
VI AN AFTERTHOUGHT
This paper has argued that there is no general connection between federalism and
gender equality in either a positive or negative direction. Instead, federalism can help or
hurt with the promotion of gender equality depending upon the way the specific aspects
of the federal system interact with the political, social and economic context of the
country. I have suggested a list of some of the specific aspects of federal systems that
create the potential for harm or benefit to gender equality and applied those aspects to
the current situation in Myanmar, in which there are ongoing negotiations about
federalism reforms. In this last section, I want to take a step back and suggest that there
might be a more general connection between federalism and gender equality that
transcends the specific aspects highlighted here. This connection operates at a very
theoretical level and I am not sure that it should have any impact on decisions by
feminists to support or oppose federalising moves in general or in any particular
country. But I raise it here because I think it highlights a different way of thinking about
the relationship between the concepts of federalism and gender equality that may prove
useful for some purposes.
My suggestion is that the connection between these two ideas is not at the level of
institutional design, but instead operates through the orientation or character of citizens.
Federalism is a set of complex and sometimes technocratic institutional arrangements,
but it can also be a kind of faith. And some of the most persuasive proponents of
federalism are those people who plainly experience it as a deeply resonant world-view,
and not merely as a bureaucratic arrangement. For people like Daniel Elazar and Vince
Ostrom, federalism captures something foundational about politics. They saw in federal
arrangements a blending of two of the most basic-albeit, perhaps inconsistent-
political goals: protection for human freedom and communal solidarity. The division of
powers between levels of government - like the separation of powers between branches
of government-is one of the primary means of protecting freedom.1 05 Indeed, it may
105 See Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society
(ICS Press, 1994).
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be that human freedom lives primarily in the interstices created by the division of power.
At the same time, political community can be more than merely instrumental; it can be
an experience of solidarity in which we try to move together toward a shared future.106
One way of understanding federalism is as a theory for reconciling these two goals, not
only through certain institutional arrangements, but also through the cultivation of a
particular orientation or character among citizens.
In order to make federalism work, citizens need several characteristics. They must be
flexible and empathetic because they will need to negotiate issues at the federal level
with people who have very different values and world-views. They must be willing to
share their country with those who have such different views. They must be able to work
together with people whose visions pose a challenge to their values without descending
into cynicism or dogmatism. Partly this is simply about accepting that we will be
different from each other and allowing communities in other subnational units to seek
solidarity in their own ways. But partly it is about being committed to moving forward
together with those different communities and struggling over which parts of our shared
life will apply to all of us and which can be the basis for community variation. Federal
citizens must be willing to tolerate ambiguity -because all federal systems include some
uncertainty about boundaries -and even contradiction. At the heart of federalism is a
commitment to work together with people with whom we disagree. This is not a mere
modus vivendi; it is a commitment to living together that makes us willing to tolerate
the, sometimes painful, challenges that we pose to each other. A pragmatic way of living
together must be more important to us than clarity or certainty or consistency.1 07
It is this orientation, this character of citizens, which makes it possible for federalism
to bring together freedom and solidarity. Because we see ourselves and each other in
this way, we can pursue a shared destiny while leaving the space for difference and
dissent and freedom. The inevitable friction generated by federal institutions is the
context in which we learn this orientation. The success of federalism may depend, then,
not on any particular institutional arrangement, but on the inculcation of this character
in citizens. For Elazar, and to a lesser degree Ostrom, this was the heart of the vision.108
106 See Daniel J Elazar, Exploring Federalism (University of Alabama Press, 1991) 5 ('In essence, a
federal arrangement is one of partnership, established and regulated by a covenant, whose
internal relationships reflect the special kind of sharing that must prevail among the partners,
based on a mutual recognition of the integrity of each partner and the attempt to foster a
special unity among them.').
107 This model of character may connect in interesting ways to the 'second-order diversity'
Heather Gerken has explored. See Heather Gerken, 'Second-Order Diversity' (2005) 118
Harvard Law Review 1099. Her analysis is focused on diversity between governance
institutions (ie different sorts of institutions that allow different groups within the population
to control certain decisions, as opposed to demanding diversity-in the form of mirror
representation-within each institution). It may be that such second-order diversity is a good
way to encourage the type of citizen character I am describing, or that this type of character
is useful to allow second-order diversity to do the work Gerken describes. Her description of
federalism as an example of this sort of diversity suggests such a connection. I am grateful to
Rosalind Dixon for pointing out the possible connection here.
108 See Elazar, above n 106, 12 ('The essence of federalism is not to be found in a particular set of
institutions but in the institutionalization of particular relationships among the participants
in political life.').
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And I would like to suggest that this vision has a connection to gender equality. It is
not a simple connection: federal citizens of this sort would not necessarily embrace the
value of gender equality and might have radically different conceptions of it, even if
they did. But there is a less direct connection between this orientation and the promotion
of gender equality. Gender equality is a challenge to all forms of traditional culture,
almost everywhere in the world. It is an idea that makes people uncomfortable and that
disrupts their expectations and social patterns. And, at the same time, gender equality
is a call to solidarity across a difference that has often blocked the capacity for empathy.
Citizens who are willing to engage with such challenges, willing to recognise the
possibility that an unfamiliar value might make a claim on them for solidarity, able to
live with the uncertainty and contradiction generated by the social negotiation of such
challenges, are crucial to the long-term success of gender equality reforms.
Obviously, the adoption of federal institutions does not guarantee that citizens will
develop this federal character. And, indeed, there may be no federal system in existence
where this orientation has been fully achieved. But recognising that this character for
citizens is a deep part of the appeal of federalism is a useful corrective to the common
dismissal of federalism as an excuse for traditional cultures to resist modernisation. In
fact, federalism- understood as based on this orientation -precludes any simple
resistance and demands engagement. We owe to each other nothing less than freedom
and solidarity. And that commitment may be the strongest foundation on which we can
build a future in which women are fully equal.
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